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SCHUM v. SOUTH BUFFALO RAILWAY:
UNINTENTIONAL UNION FAILURE TO PROCESS
GRIEVANCE CONSTITUTES BREACH OF UNION'S
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
In Schum v. South Buffalo Railway,' a case which arose under the
Railway Labor Act,2 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
unintentional failure by a union to prosecute a timely appeal to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board3 on behalf of a union member dis-
charged from employment constituted a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation, 4 which excused the aggrieved member's failure to
pursue his administrative remedies. James Schum, the union member,
was discharged from employment by the South Buffalo Railway after
failing to report for a scheduled physical examination and then failing
to appear at a disciplinary hearing convened to consider his failure to
report for the examination.' Upon Schum's request for assistance, the
General Chairman of his local union agreed to process a grievance on
Schum's behalf. A written complaint, the required first step in the
grievance procedure,6 was filed with the railroad and was rejected. The
1. 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
3. The National Railroad Adjustment Board was created by section 3 First of the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1970), for the purpose of settling disputes
and grievances growing out of the interpretation and application of collective bargaining
agreements. For further discussion of the Adjustment Board, see text accompanying
notes 12-22 infra.
4. For a discussion of the duty of fair representation, see text accompanying notes
31-41 infra.
5. Schum was ordered by the railroad to report for a physical examination in order
to resolve a dispute over whether he was physically capable of resuming his regular du-
ties after six months of recuperation from personal injuries received in the course of his
employment. 496 F.2d at 329.
The positions of the parties to this dispute are not clear from a reading of the opin-
ion and the briefs. Schum's nonappearance for the physical was apparently occasioned
by the railroad's refusal to allow his attorney to be present. He allegedly did not appear
at the disciplinary hearing because the railroad refused to postpone the hearing until
Schum's attorney returned from vacation. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Schum v. South
Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. Under the Railway Labor Act, the details of an individual grievance adjustment
procedure are stipulated by the union and employer in their collective bargaining agree-
ment, subject to the requirement of section 3 First(i) of the Act that the grievance must
be processed to the chief management representative designated for the handling of such
disputes. This requirement must be satisfied prior to an appeal to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(i) (1970).
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next step, as stipulated in rule 36 of the collective bargaining agreement
between the union and the railroad, would have been the filing of an
appeal with the National Railroad Adjustment Board by the aggrieved
employee or his union within six months of rejection of the complaint.7
The union not only failed to file an appeal but also neglected to
inform Schum that his appeal would not be processed.8 When Schum
learned that his union had allowed his right to administrative review to
expire without acting, he filed an action in federal district court against
the railroad for wrongful discharge in violation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and against three union defendants' for breach of their
duty of fair representation. The railroad moved for and obtained sum-
mary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. 10 The Second Circuit reversed and remand-
ed.'1
7. Section b of rule 36 of the collective bargaining agreement provided, in per-
tinent part:
All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer [desig-
nated by the Company to handle claims and grievances] shall be barred unless
within 6 months from the date of his decision proceedings are instituted by the
Employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having juris-
diction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved. 496
F.2d at 331 n.3.
8. The failure of the union to file a timely appeal with the Adjustment Board is
not explained in the opinion or in the appellate brief of either party. The failure was
apparently unintentional. Significantly, Schum does not appear to have alleged hostility
or bad faith as the motivation for the union's failure.
9. Schum's union was the United Transportation Union. In addition to the em-
ployer railroad, Schum sued the national union, his local union (John O'Leary Lodge
E668, formerly a local of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen), and
the General Chairman of the local. Brief for Appellee at 1, Schum v. South Buffalo
Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
The union defendants joined in the railroad's motion for summary judgment, see
note 10 infra and accompanying text, but did not file a brief or participate in the oral
argument. Schum v. United Transp. Union, Lodge E668, Civil No. 1970-11, at 2
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1973).
10. The district court granted the railroad's motion for summary judgment but de-
nied the motion of the union defendants. Schum v. United Transp. Union, Lodge E668,
Civil No. 1970-11, at 8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1973). This result, though it left Schum
with the union defendants to proceed against, would be unsatisfactory to Schum because
of the severe limitation imposed by the Supreme Court on recovery of damages from
a union for breach of its duty of fair representation in Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970), where the Court held:
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any, discrim-
inatory conduct and a subsequent discriminatory refusal by the union to proc-
ess grievances based on the discharge, damages against the union for loss of
employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle
the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the em-
ployer. Id. at 29.
See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196-98 (1967).
11. The appellate court directed that "if the district court finds on remand that
Schum reasonably relied on his union to prosecute his grievance, the railroad's defense
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Among the express purposes listed by Congress upon amendment
of the Railway Labor Act in 193412 was an intent to facilitate the resolu-
tion of disputes and grievances growing out of the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements. 13  This category of dis-
pute is commonly known as a "minor" dispute, 4 and includes discharge
grievances.", By the 1934 amendment, 16 the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board was created and given jurisdiction to decide these minor
disputes.' 7 Resort to the Adjustment Board has been held by the courts
of nonexhaustion would not bar his wrongful discharge suit." 496 F.2d at 332. Thus,
assuming a finding that Schum reasonably relied on his union, the district court will de-
cide the case on the merits of Schum's claim of wrongful discharge.
12. Act of June 21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-442, ch. 691, § 2, 48 Stat. 1186-87, amend-
ing 48 U.S.C. § 151 (1928) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1970)).
13. The purposes of the chapter are: ... (5) to provide for the prompt and
orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter-
pretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1970).
14. The courts have adopted the designation of disputes arising under the Railway
Labor Act as "minor" and "major." See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
723 (1945). Major disputes relate to the formation or alteration of the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement rather than to the interpretation and application of an ex-
isting agreement. Major disputes are not subject to binding resolution, as are minor dis-
putes, and work stoppages may result if the parties are unable to resolve their differences
with the assistance of the National Mediation Board, another agency created by the Rail-
way Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). For further discussion of the handling of
major and minor disputes and the potential difficulty in distinguishing the two, see
Risher, The Railvay Labor Act, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 51, 57-85 (1970).
15. Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966).
16. Act of June 21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-442, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185, amending
45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1928) (codified at 45 U.S.C. H9 151-88 (1970)).
17. Section 3 First(i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(i) (1970),
provides:
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application
of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including
cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated
to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts
and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
Prior to 1934, minor disputes were handled by over 300 arbitration boards, most
of which were limited in jurisdiction to a single railroad. This diffuse approach to mi-
nor disputes proved unworkable for a number of reasons. See Garrison, The National
Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567, 573-
76 (1937).
In considering the 1934 Amendments, the House Committee on Interstate Com-
merce stated:
Many thousands of these disputes have been considered by boards estab-
lished under the Railway Labor Act; but the boards have been unable to reach
a majority decision, and so the proceedings have been deadlocked. These un-
adjusted disputes have become so numerous that on several occasions the em-
ployees have resorted to the issuance of strike ballots and threatened to inter-
rupt interstate commerce in order to secure an adjustment. This has made it
[Vol. 1974:988
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to be the mandatory and exclusive remedy when a minor dispute is not
resolved between the parties.' In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad,"9 the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's dismissal of an
employee's action against his employer for wrongful discharge on the
ground that plaintiff-employee had failed to pursue his administrative
remedy before the Adjustment Board. This remedy provided by the
Railway Labor Act for settlement of minor disputes is not optional, the
Court ruled, but mandatory.20 Furthermore, the Court explained that
the phrase "exhaustion of remedies" applies to the settlement of minor
disputes under the Railway Labor Act only "in its broader sense" be-
cause the administrative remedy is exclusive.2' Thus, an aggrieved party
must take his dispute to the Adjustment Board and may not litigate the
dispute in state or federal court. Review of a decision of the Adjustment
Board is limited to the judicial review provided by the Railway Labor
Act.S2
necessary for the President of the United States to intervene and establish an
emergency board to investigate the .ontroversies. This condition should be
corrected in the interest of industrial peace and of uninterrupted transportation
service. This bill, therefore, provides for the establishment of a national board
of adjustment to which these disputes may be submitted if they shall not have
been adjusted in conference between the parties. H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), quoted in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
726 n.22 (1945).
18. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Slocum v. Delaware, L. &
W.R.R., 339 U.S 239 (1950); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946);
Local 1477, United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1973); Baker v.
United Transp. Union, 455 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1971); Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men & Enginemen v. Southern Pac., 447 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1971).
19. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
20. Id. at 322.
21. Id. at 325. The phrase "exhaustion of administrative remedies," in its usual
sense, refers to the requirement that administrative remedies must be pursued to comple-
tion before judicial review may be sought. See K. DAvis, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§ 20.01 (3d ed. 1972). The statement by the Andrews Court that "exhaustion of reme-
dies" applies "in a broader sense," 406 U.S. at 325, means that decisions of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board are not reviewable. Thus, when a party's administrative
remedy is exhausted he has no further remedy unless the Board exceeded its authority.
The basis of this "nonreviewability" is the statutory restriction embodied in the Railway
Labor Act. See note 22 infra. See also K. DAVIs, supra, §§ 28.01-07.
22. 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First(p), (q) (1970). The judicial review provision of Section
3 First was amended in 1966 because Congress found that
if an employee receives an award in his favor from the Board, the railroad af-
fected may obtain judicial review of that award by declining to comply with
it. If, however, an employee fails to receive an award in his favor, there is
no means by which judicial review may be obtained. H.R. REP. No. 1114,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, quoted in Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198
(1966).
As amended in 1966, Section 3 First(p) now makes an order of the Adjustment
Board "conclusive on the parties," in a suit for enforcement rather than merely "prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." Section 3 First(q) was added to provide judi-
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There are exceptions to the mandatory and exclusive administrative
remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for the resolution of minor
disputes; under certain circumstances an employee may bring an action
against his employer in federal court rather than before the Adjustment
Board. In the landmark case of Vaca v. Sipes,23 which arose under the
National Labor Relations Act,24 the Supreme Court identified several
situations which would justify an employee's failure to exhaust his con-
tractual and administrative remedies. Employer repudiation of the
grievance procedure will justify direct resort to the courts,2" as will a
breach by the union of its duty of fair representation in the handling of a
grievance.20 The Court specifically identified the situation of a hostile
union's wrongful refusal to process a grievance where it has complete
control of a member's right to grieve, 2  but since this situation cannot
arise under the Railway Labor Act,28 it seems that the Vaca Court's
blanket exception for a union breach of the duty of fair representation
must also include the case where the union does not control the grievance
cial review of the order for the losing party, but it reiterates that the order shall be "con-
clusive on the parties" and may not be set aside except for failure by the Board to com-
ply with the statute, failure of jurisdiction, or corruption. Act of June 20, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-456, §§ 2(c), (e), 80 Stat. 210, amending 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964) (codified
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (p), (q) (1970)).
23. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
25. The Court explained where this action would be appropriate: "An obvious situ-
ation in which the employee should not be limited to the exclusive remedial procedures
established by the contract occurs when the conduct of the employer amounts to a repu-
diation of those contractual procedures." 386 U.S. at 185.
26. The Vaca Court said:
[We think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action
against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the contractual reme-
dies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent
breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's griev-
ance. Id. at 186.
27. The Vaca Court observed:
We think that another situation when the employee may seek judicial en-
forcement of his contractual rights arises if, as is true here, the union has sole
power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance proce-
dure, and if, as is alleged here, the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from
exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process
the grievance. Id. at 185.
28. The Supreme Court has held that the Railway Labor Act grants to the employee
the right to participate at every stage of the grievance adjustment process and to process
his grievance independently of his union. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
733-36 (1945). These rights are statutory and may not be abrogated by agreement be-
tween the employer and the union. Id. at 740 n.39.
In contrast, the National Labor Relations Act permits the employer and the union
to retain exclusive control of the grievance procedure. Black-Clawson Co. v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 185 (1967); Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). For
the Court's specific language in Vaca, see note 27 supra.
992
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process. In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway,2" the Vaca hold-
ing was applied to a case arising under the Railway Labor Act. The
Court ruled that a group of railroad carmen helpers, who alleged they
were denied promotion on the basis of race through the collusion of their
employer and their union, could pursue their remedy in federal court
rather than before the Adjustment Board. 30 Thus, it is clear from Vaca
and Glover that a railroad employee whose union breaches its duty of
fair representation in handling his grievance can sue in federal court, and
his action will not be summarily disposed of for failure to pursue his
administrative remedy before the Adjustment Board. The question left
partially unanswered by Vaca is precisely what may constitute a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation.
The concept of a union's duty of fair representation was first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road." ' The union in Steele sought to negotiate an agreement with the
employer which would have precluded the promotion and further hiring
of black firemen, and it had concurred in work assignments which fa-
vored white firemen over black firemen with greater seniority. The
Court ruled that the union's behavior violated a duty of representation
implicit in the Railway Labor Act.32 Having previously construed the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act as conferring
upon unions the status of exclusive bargaining representative for all
members of the bargaining unit,33 the Court in Steele found a correlative
29. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
30. The Court created a new exception to the exhaustion requirement in Glover:
an aggrieved employee need not exhaust his contractual or administrative remedies
where to do so would be futile. Id. at 330. Further, the Glover Court acknowledged
the possible existence of further exceptions to the exhaustion requirement when it ob-
served that
[t]be Court in Vaca went on to specify at least two situations in which
suit could be brought by the employee despite his failure to exhaust fully his
contractual remedies. The circumstances of the present case call into play an-
other of the most obvious exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. . . . Id.
(emphasis added).
At least one commentator has interpreted the Glover opinion as an invitation to the
lower federal courts to create new exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See Simp-
son & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51
TEXAS L. REV. 1179, 1212-13 (1973).
31. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
32. The Court stated:
We hold that the language of the [Railway Labor] Act . . . read in the
light of the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on
the bargaining representative . . . the duty to exercise fairly the power con-
ferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts. . . . Id. at 202-03.
33. The role of the majority union under the Railway Labor Act as exclusive bar-
gaining agent for all members of the bargaining unit was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Order of Ry. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 347
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obligation to treat all members of the bargaining unit fairly and equally.
The standard announced by the Steele Court required the union to repre-
sent members of the bargaining unit "without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith. '3 4 The racial discrimination prac-
ticed by the union in Steele clearly breached this duty of fair representa-
tion.35
Apart from the racial discrimination context, however, the extent of
the union's duty remained unclear until Vaca v. Sipes. 6 There the
Supreme Court defined more clearly the union behavior which could
breach its duty:
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith ....
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion, we
do not agree that the individual employee has an absolute right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreement.37
The "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" standard established in
Vaca sets a high threshold requirement for the allegation of a breach of
the union's duty and leaves the union with wide discretion to decide in
good faith whether to prosecute an individual's grievance. Yet, the
Court's use of the words "arbitrary" and "perfunctory," without explain-
ing their meaning, left the Vaca holding open to interpretation and led
some courts and commentators to conclude that the Court had aban-
doned the requirement of bad faith and hostility.3 8  It would seem, how-
(1944). See also J.I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (recognizing the same
proposition with respect to the National Labor Relations Act).
34. 323 U.S. at 204.
35. Subsequent to Steele, racial discrimination in the handling of grievances was
held to violate the union's duty of fair representation in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957); and in Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), racial
discrimination by one union practiced against members of another union was held to
violate the duty.
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. Id. at 190-91.
38. In Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), the court stated:
The repeated references in Vaca to "arbitrary" union conduct reflected a
calculated broadening of the fair representation standard. . . . Without any
hostile motive of discrimination and in complete good faith, a union may nev-
ertheless pursue a course of action or inaction that is so unreasonable and ar-
bitrary as to constitute a violation of the duty of fair representation. Id. at
183.
The court also noted, however, that "negligence in handling grievances has not been
identified as breaching the union's duty of fair representation." Id. See Retana v.
Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 1972); Tobias, A Plea
[VCol. 1974:988
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ever, that the Court used "arbitrary" and "perfunctory" to describe
prohibited union motivations and attitudes, rather than to prohibit good
faith union behavior which results in arbitrary or perfunctory treatment
of the employee. Read in its entirety, the language of the Vaca Court
supports the conclusion that only intentional, conscious union conduct
can breach its duty. This conclusion is further strengthened by the sub-
sequent case of Amalgamated Association of Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge.3 9 There the Court, in dismissing an employee's assertion
that he was suing his union to rectify a breach of the duty of fair
representation, stated with force and clarity the requisites of a union
breach of the duty of fair representation and, for the first time, specifi-
cally excluded the possibility of an unintentional breach:
The duty of fair representation was judicially evolved . . . to
enforce fully the important principle that no individual union member
may suffer invidious, hostile treatment at the hands of the majority of
his coworkers . . . [The doctrine] carries with it the need to adduce
substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and
unrelated to legitimate union objectives . . . . [T]he very distinction
, . . between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand, and deliberate
and severely hostile and irrational treatment on the other, needs strictly
to be maintained.40
Despite the clear language of Lockridge, there remains pressure to ex-
pand the duty of fair representation to proscribe unintentional and negli-
gent union conduct.41
for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv.
55, 73-77 (1972). But see Williams v. General Foods, 492 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir.
1974); Jackson v. Trans World Airline, Inc., 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Some-
thing akin to factual malice is necessary to establish a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation").
39. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
40. Id. at 301.
41. Lockridge was an embarrassing decision for the proponents of an expanded duty
of fair representation who found a liberalized standard in the Vaca opinion. See note
38 supra. The Lockridge standard is considerably more stringent than the reading given
Vaca by the courts and commentators favoring such a liberalization, yet there is nothing
in Lockridge to indicate that the Court intended to alter the Vaca standard. Thus, the
Lockridge standard implicitly refutes the existence of a liberalized standard in Vaca.
One writer has attempted to resolve this difficulty by characterizing the Lockridge
Court's discussion of the duty of fair representation as "ringing dictum" which exhibits
a "lack of care in using language and analysis" and therefore "must be somewhat dis-
counted." Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual
Rights, 51 TEXAs L. REv. 1037, 1070 (1973). Even if the Court's discussion was dic-
tum, however, it should be considered a clear signal to the lower courts that they have
been misreading Vaca. Furthermore, a careful reading of Lockridge indicates that the
Court's analysis of the duty of fair representation was essential to the holding. Lock-
ridge obtained a judgment in state court against his union. The Supreme Court granted
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The Second Circuit in Schum v. South Buffalo Railway expanded
the definition of a union's duty of fair representation to include the situ-
ation where the interests of a union member are impaired by uninten-
tional union mishandling of his grievance. The facts of the case pre-
sented a compelling and sympathetic picture of a union member who
found himself without a remedy through little or no fault of his own.
However, the vehicle chosen by the court to enable Schum to sue his
employer for wrongful discharge-a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation-was supported by neither precedent nor policy. In
Vaca, the Supreme Court, while admittedly creating some ambiguity by
its uncertain use of the words "arbitrary" and "perfunctory," seemed
clearly to intend to maintain the Steele requirement of hostile or dis-
criminatory union conduct. Subsequently, in Lockridge, the Court de-
scribed the type of union conduct which will breach the duty in such
terms as "invidious," "hostile," "intentional," "severe," and "deliber-
ate,"'42 The duty is not breached, on the other hand, by "honest mistaken
conduct. 43  While acknowledging that the Vaca standard left some
interpretational questions unanswered," the court in Schum ignored the
certiorari to determine whether the jurisdiction of the state court was preempted by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 403 U.S. at 276-77.
Lockridge argued that his case came within a recognized exception to the preemption
doctrine for actions to redress a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 298.
Thus, to decide whether the general rule of preemption applied, the Court had to deter-
mine whether the exception applied because Lockridge neither alleged nor proved that
his union engaged in the type of conduct which would breach the duty of fair represen-
tation. Id. at 299-300. It seems clear that if the Court had found that the honest, mis-
taken union behavior in Lockridge constituted a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion, it would have been compelled to uphold rather than reverse the Idaho Supreme
Court. Therefore, to classify the Court's analysis as dictum is fallacious.
Another writer has suggested that the Lockridge Court simply misread Vaca.
See Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REv.
1119, 1125 (1973). The logic behind this author's conclusion is as follows: (1) Vaca
established a broad standard for identifying a breach of the duty of fair representation;
(2) Lockridge posited a much more stringent standard, yet the Court gave no indication
that it meant to make substantive changes in the duty of fair representation; (3) there-
fore, the Lockridge Court misread Vaca. Id. at 1125-26. The flaw in this logic stems
from its initial premise. The Court did not intend to establish a broad standard in Vaca.
Lockridge merely reiterated the Vaca standard in language that could not be miscon-
strued by the lower courts. The suggestion by Ms. Clark that the lower courts should
ignore Lockridge unless and until the Supreme Court bases a duty of fair representation
holding on it, id. at 1126, is misguided and mischievous. Decisions of the Supreme
Court become binding upon the lower courts when handed down, not the first time they
are cited in a subsequent decision of the Court.
42. 403 U.S. at 301.
43. Id.
44. The Schum court observed that the Vaca Court did not define "precisely the
duty of fair representation." 496 F.2d at 330.
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subsequent clarification in Lockridge45 and assumed, without discussion,
that no showing of intentionally hostile, discriminatory, or indivious un-
ion intent was necessary. The court implicitly bound the union to a duty
of due care and diligence. This assumption clearly expanded the param-
eters of the duty of fair representation in contradiction to its previous
definition by the Supreme Court.
Further weight is lent to the conclusion that the Schum court im-
permissibly expanded the duty of fair representation by an examination
of the policy considerations which underly the decisions of the Supreme
Court in this area. The Court has discerned the intent of Congress to
preserve and protect the position of the union as the bargaining repre-
sentative and to intrude as seldom as possible in internal union affairs. 4
Where the courts are called upon to consider a union's handling of a
grievance, this interpretation of congressional intent manifests itself in a
noninterventionist judicial pose which allows a union wide discretion
and a presumption of reasonableness in the handling and settling of
grievances. As the Court made clear in Vaca, a union member (or
other member of the bargaining unit) has no absolute right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration. 47  The union may make its own decision
as to the merits of the grievance and may even settle a meritorious
grievance against the employee, subject only to the requirement of the
duty of fair representation that the union's conduct not be arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith.4 8 Thus, the duty of fair representation, as
it has been given substance by the Court that created it, is not intended
to authorize judicial oversight of the manner in which a union handles
employee grievances or other internal affairs, unless the union behavior
is wrongfully motivated.
45. By ignoring Lockridge, the Second Circuit, perhaps unwittingly, followed the ad-
vice of Ms. Clark. See note 41 supra. At least three other circuits, however, by citing
Lockridge with approval, have recognized that the Lockridge standard is to be applied
in determining whether a union breached its duty of fair representation. See Dente v.
International Organization of Masters, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10, 12 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2607 (1974); Wernet v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 484 F.2d
403, 405 (6th Cir. 1973); Buzzard v. Local 1041, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 480
F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir. 1973); Patterson v. Local 513, Motion Picture Operators, 446 F.2d
205, 208 (10th Cir. 1971).
46. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-90 (1967);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953).
47. 386 U.S. at 190-95.
48. The Vaca Court enumerated several of the purposes served by deference to the
union in the handling of grievances: elimination of frivolous grievances, consistent
treatment of grievances by the union, consistent interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, reduction in time and money spent in the grievance process, and strength-
ening the union as statutory agent of the employees and as co-author of the collective
agreement. Id. at 191-92.
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The facts in Schum, where the union apparently simply missed the
appeal deadline, do not present as persuasive an argument for judicial
deference as does a case such as Vaca, where the union consciously
decided to go no further with the member's grievance. Nonetheless, the
policies underlying judicial deference to unions argue against finding a
breach of the union's duty. The care and efficiency with which a union
handles grievances is undoubtedly in part a matter of allocation of
limited time and money. Holding unions liable for honest mistakes and
oversights would require unions to reallocate their limited resources to
the detriment of other important functions as representative of the
bargaining unit. Viewed in the context of the congressional preference
for nonintervention in internal union affairs and of the judicial deference
to union grievance-handling where there is no evidence of improper
union motivation, the Schum holding seems clearly wrong.
Another undesirable result of the Schum decision is that the union
bears little or no liability for its breach,49 whereas the employer may be
seriously disadvantaged. The Schum decision suspends the operation
of the contractually agreed statute of limitations, thus forcing the em-
ployer to defend an action which it could reasonably have expected to
expire when no appeal was filed with the Adjustment Board within the
stipulated six month period." Further, every time a court excuses an
employee's failure to pursue his administrative remedy before the Ad-
justment Board, the expectation of the employer that the administrative
forum will be exclusive is defeated, thus penalizing the employer for
the union's misconduct. While this anomalous result is necessary to
protect the employee when the union acts in a hostile or discriminatory
fashion, the frequency of its occurrence should not be multiplied by
extending the duty of fair representation, and hence the avoidance of
the statutory administrative remedy, to cases of unintentional union be-
havior.
The basis suggested by the court for its decision-reliance-is
clearly not a satisfactory theoretical foundation for an expanded defini-
tion of the duty of fair representation. Virtually all union members who
49. See note 10 supra.
50. It can be argued that the employer has really lost nothing by the frustration
of the statute of limitations, since the union's failure to file a timely appeal was a wind-
fall which saved the employer the expense of defending before the Adjustment Board.
Nonetheless, from the employer's point of view, the failure of the union to appeal could
reasonably have been interpreted as bringing the entire grievance to a close, and there
is a real possibility that revival of the employee's barred complaint in a federal court
action will prejudice the employer's ability to gather evidence. The employer may have
failed to preserve testimonial or documentary evidence which would have been available
if the appeal had been made in a timely manner.
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wish to protest an action of their employer rely upon their union,5' yet
Vaca clearly holds that a union may act contrary to what the grievant
believes to be his best interest, as long as the union's action is not arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 52 The use of reliance to identify
a breach of the duty of fair representation is particularly inapt under
the Railway Labor Act where a member's reliance on his union is
merely optional rather than compulsory. The Act does not allow unions
to compel individual members to rely on them, but instead allows a
member the option of pursuing his remedy before the Adjustment Board
independently of his union.53
The Schum court's use of reliance does suggest, however, a possible
alternative analysis by which the court could have reached the result it
desired without the impermissible expansion of the duty of fair represen-
tation which it in fact accomplished. To revive Schum's right of action
against the railroad for wrongful discharge, the court found it necessary
to avoid the exhaustion requirement. Of the exceptions to the ex-
haustion requirement posited in Vaca, only the breach of the duty of
fair representation is remotely relevant, which undoubtedly explains its
use. Yet in the subsequent case of Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway,54 the Supreme Court added another to Vaca's list of exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement and seemed to invite the recognition of
still further exceptions.55 Thus, the Schum court could have created a
new exception and held that an employee need not exhaust his con-
tractual and administrative remedies where he has the right to pursue
his grievance on his own, but his union undertakes to do it for him and
then fails to notify him that it is, for whatever reason, abandoning his
grievance, thus preventing the employee from pursuing it in his own
right. A narrow holding of this purport would have furnished the
Schum court the exception to exhaustion which it needed without a
wholesale and unjustified expansion of the duty of fair representation
and the importation of the alien concept of reliance into this area of
labor law.
51. Under the National Labor Relations Act, the union and employer can compel
employees to grieve through the union. Under the Railway Labor Act this is not per-
mitted. See note 28 supra. As a practical matter, most aggrieved employees will grieve
through their union because the union will usually possess greater wealth, experience,
and influence with employers than the employee will have, thus increasing the chances
of success.
52. 386 U.S. at 190-93.
53. See note 28 supra.
54. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
55. Id. at 330. See note 30 supra.
